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This paper provides the first joint analysis of household stockholding participation, location 
among  stockholding  modes,  and  participation  spillovers.  Our  model  matches  observed 
participation, conditional and unconditional, and asset location patterns. We find that financial 
sophistication correlates strongly only with direct stockholding and mutual fund participation, 
while social interactions mainly influence stockholding through retirement accounts. Whether 
retirement account owners include7 stocks in them strongly depends on owner characteristics, 
unlike with mutual fund owners and investment in stock funds. Stockholding is more common 
among retirement account owners, but mainly because of owner characteristics rather than 
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1.  Introduction 
In  the  past  two  decades,  the  US  and  major  European  countries  have  witnessed  an 
expanded range of financial products, such as mutual funds and retirement accounts, and a 
significant increase in household financial risk taking. Increasing ratios of retirees to workers, 
resulting from the ageing of the population, challenge the ability of social security systems to 
provide adequate pension levels and make it imperative for households to take advantage of 
asset  accumulation  opportunities  during  their  working  life.  Stocks  have  gained  increasing 
importance in household portfolios, mainly because of their wealth generating potential over 
longer  investment  horizons.
1  As  a  result  of  financial  innovation  and  policy  incentives, 
individuals can now invest in stocks directly, through shares in mutual funds involving stocks, 
as well as through defined contribution pension plans and individual retirement accounts. 
Proliferation  of  financial  instruments  has  enhanced  the  ability  of  fully  informed  and 
financially sophisticated households to accumulate wealth for retirement. On the other hand,  
it may have also introduced asymmetric hurdles for the less sophisticated, less wealthy or 
more risk averse, who now need to make active portfolio choices instead of relying on social 
security benefits provided to them through a pension formula.  
As documented below, observed household portfolios are very heterogeneous in terms 
of the list of included assets, in contrast to the implications of simple ‘two-fund separation’ 
theorems derived in textbook models of asset pricing. Overall stock market participation is 
limited to about half of the population in the US; much fewer households own stocks directly 
or through mutual funds. Stockholders choose various combinations of stockholding modes, 
i.e., they favor different patterns of stock location. Households who own retirement accounts 
in order to meet the financial challenges of old age exhibit higher stockholding participation 
rates than the population at large. It is unclear, however, if such stock market participation is 
due to retirement account ownership per se (e.g. because it confers some knowledge about   2 
investing  in  stocks)  or  rather  to  their  own  characteristics  that  are  generally  conducive  to 
stockholding. 
In this new environment, at least three important questions arise: Who is more likely to 
take advantage of the various available stockholding opportunities? Given stock ownership in 
any form, what determines the choice of investment vehicles through which stocks are held 
(e.g. mutual funds)? Finally, given the widespread use of defined-contribution pension plans 
and  retirement  accounts  in  the  US,  does  ownership  of  such  accounts  make  stockholding 
outside them (in the form of direct holdings or stock mutual funds) also more likely? 
Up to now, analysis of these three questions, i.e. participation, location, and spillovers, 
has been performed separately. The participation literature has attributed limited household 
participation in the stock market mainly to fixed entry/participation costs.
2 Possible factors 
that  account  for  limited  participation  among  well-to-do  households  (for  whom  such  costs 
would not be a deterrent) include asset ignorance (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005), lack of trust 
(Guiso,  Zingales and Sapienza, 2008), social interactions (Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004), 
cognitive difficulties (Christelis, Jappelli and Padula, 2010), and lack of financial literacy 
(Van Rooij, Alessie, and Lusardi, 2007). 
The importance of asset location has been stressed by Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) 
and Garlappi and Huang (2006), who put emphasis on tax considerations by studying possible 
violations  of  optimal  stock  placement  between  taxable  (such  as  directly  held  stocks  and 
mutual funds) and tax-deferred vehicles (retirement accounts).  
Asset  participation  spillovers  have  not  been  extensively  studied  up  to  now,  but  are 
starting to receive attention in view of population aging and increased ownership of retirement 
accounts.  An  important  research  and  policy  question  is  whether  ownership  of  retirement 
accounts, which is induced by the need to finance retirement, will also promote other forms of 
stockholding.  Retirement  accounts  are  regarded  as  the  main  factor  behind  the  spread  of 
stockholding in the US. A 2005 report by the Investment Company Institute and Securities   3 
Industry  Association  stresses  the  role  of  defined  contribution  pension  plans,  especially 
401(k)s in this context.
3 A positive view of their role in promoting direct stockholding in 
Sweden among households that made an active fund choice, decided to hold equity, or to hold 
more funds within the public pension scheme special to Sweden, is provided by Karlsson, 
Massa, and Simonov (2007). On the other hand, Cardak and Wilkins (2009) argue that the 
introduction of mandatory contributions into employer based pension funds in Australia has 
not reduced or otherwise influenced direct stockholding. 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  the  current  paper  represents  the  first  integrated 
econometric analysis of all three issues in the context of a unified model that distinguishes 
between different stockholding choices and allows for interrelationships among observable 
and unobservable factors influencing stockholding choices.  
There is good reason to distinguish among investments in different stockholding modes, 
because  their  risk  properties,  management  requirements,  and  liquidity  characteristics,  are 
quite different. Direct stockholding is very risky (due to limited diversification), management-
intensive, and fairly liquid. Mutual funds are quite liquid, but tend to be well-diversified and 
professionally  rather  than  individually  managed.  Retirement  accounts  are  typically  tax-
deferred, well diversified, though quite illiquid.  
Participation costs also differ across these modes. Directly held stocks are subject to 
brokerage  fees,  and  require  both  constant  monitoring  of  the  market  and  considerable 
information about firm characteristics. Mutual funds also have fees, and require performance 
monitoring, and complex choices among numerous alternative funds. On the other hand, they 
delegate  responsibility  for  asset  allocation  to  professionals.  Finally,  while  investment  in 
retirement accounts is tax deferred, investment in stocks directly and through mutual funds is 
on an after tax basis, and dividends and capital gains are taxable. 
In  view  of  these  fundamental  differences  in  properties  of  different  stockholding 
vehicles, there is no a priori reason to think that they are equally likely to be chosen by   4 
households of given characteristics, observable  or unobservable. We differentiate between 
stockholding vehicles, allowing for different roles of characteristics in each choice, and for 
correlations  of  unobserved  factors  influencing  the  different  choices.  Our  approach  is 
supported by differences in estimated patterns of influence of household characteristics on the 
different choices, economically and statistically significant estimates of correlations among 
unobservables,  and  by  predicted  participation  rates  that  closely  match  the  observed  ones, 
whether unconditional or conditional.   
We  find  sizeable  effects  of  educational  attainment,  financial  sophistication,  and 
financial information acquired by working in the financial sector on both direct stockholding 
and ownership of mutual funds. Such effects support the view that mutual fund investment is 
not  much  simpler  than  participation  in  directly  held  stocks.  Participation  in  retirement 
accounts, rather than being easily accessible to all, still depends heavily on factors such as 
educational attainment, race, willingness to take risks, and working in the financial sector. 
Social interactions turn out to be important for participation in retirement accounts, the widely 
held asset, but not for mutual funds or directly held stocks that are much more narrowly held. 
Among stockholders, we find significant gender effects on where stocks are located, with 
women preferring mutual funds and men direct holdings of stocks, controlling for remaining 
characteristics.  
Given  the  popularity  of  retirement  accounts  and  the  financial  information  US 
households acquire through such ownership, should we expect them to be more likely to take 
up direct stockholding or stock mutual funds? In the data, we do find that retirement account 
owners are more likely to invest in other forms of stockholding than the general population. 
Our model allows us to examine whether this tendency is due to the characteristics that led 
them to own retirement accounts in the first place or to any informational spillovers from 
retirement  account  ownership.  Our  estimates  do  not  suggest  the  presence  of  significant 
spillovers in this direction.    5 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents descriptive statistics on 
participation in the different stockholding modes and on asset location among stockholders. 
Section  3  presents  the  estimation  model.  Section  4  presents  econometric  results  on 
participation in direct stockholding, mutual funds, retirement accounts, and in stockholding 
through mutual funds and retirement accounts. Section 5 presents our findings concerning 
asset  location.  Section  6  discusses  asset  participation  spillovers,  while  Section  7  offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Stockholding Modes in the Data 
We use data from four waves (1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004) of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), which is the only US survey that is representative of the whole population 
and provides detailed information on all three possible stockholding modes as well as on 
investors’ characteristics, attitudes and practices.
4 Two additional features of the SCF are that 
the data are not subject to top coding of wealthy households; and that the rich, who own the 
largest share of wealth and are difficult to interview, are oversampled. Details on the survey 
design are provided in Kennickell (2000).
 In our analysis, we employ weights provided by the 
survey in order to make sample statistics representative for the whole population. Information 
on asset definitions and the construction of our variables can be found in Technical Appendix 
RAIII, available from the authors on request. The dates chosen encompass the peak of the 
stock market upswing of the middle and late nineties, the immediate aftermath of the stock 
market drop in 2000, and part of the subsequent market recovery. 
Table 1 presents ownership rates in the data. Slightly more than half of households have 
retirement accounts, and more than three quarters of retirement account holders hold stocks in 
them.  Stockholding  through  retirement  accounts  is  the  most  widespread  mode  of 
stockholding, chosen by about 38% of the population (twice as much as direct stockholding). 
Approximately 15% of households invest in stock mutual funds.    6 
Looking at trends over our sample period, stockholding participation in general rose 
above the 50% mark in 2001, but then fell below it by 2004; this development is also reflected 
in each of the stockholding modes. Among mutual fund owners, however, the share of those 
investing in stock mutual funds has slightly increased since 1998. Participation in the other 
two  modes  was  higher  in  2004  than  in  1998,  but  the  popularity  of  stocks  fell  among 
retirement account holders in 2004.  
Table  2  refers  to  stock  location,  i.e.,  the  use  of  the  three  (not  mutually  exclusive) 
stockholding options by stockholders. Approximately 80% of them have stocks in retirement 
accounts, which is by far the most popular location choice. About half as many stockholders 
invest in stocks directly, while under one third own stock mutual funds. The popularity of 
stock retirement accounts seems to have risen and then fallen over the period, as did that of 
stock mutual funds. However, direct stockholding kept rising throughout the period among 
those who owned stocks in any form. 
Table 3 provides additional information on stock location by reporting the distribution 
of stockholders among all possible combinations of stockholding modes. By far the most 
popular choice of stockholders is to hold stocks only in their retirement accounts (more than 
40% of stockholders in all years). A distant but clear second is the combination of stocks in 
retirement  accounts  with  direct  stockholding.  Use  of  all  three  modes  is  observed  among 
slightly more than 10% of households. Interestingly, while percentages differ across years 
somewhat, the ranking of these options has remained the same for households in the stock 
market, despite dramatic market swings.
5  
It  is  also  instructive  to  contrast  the  distribution  of  demographic  and  economic 
characteristics  of  stockholders  to  that  in  the  general  population  (shown  in  Table  4). 
Stockholding in any of the three modes, including the most common one, is undertaken by 
households quite different from the general population. Specifically, stockholders are more 
likely to be in a couple, college graduates, white, managers, and in better health, and less   7 
likely to be unemployed. In terms of financial attitudes and practices, they are much more 
likely  than  the  general  population  to  assume  a  higher  than  average  financial  risk  and  to 
consider  leaving  a  bequest.  Finally,  stockholders  tend  to  be  far  richer  in  terms  of  non-
investment income and real and financial wealth, to be subject to a higher federal marginal tax 
rate and less likely to be credit constrained. Stockholders are more likely to work (or to have 
worked)  in  the  financial  sector,  and  less  likely  to  work  in  an  industry  that  exhibits  high 
income  risk.
6  All  in  all,  the  data  in  this  Section  make  it  clear  that  the  subsample  of 
stockholders  is  substantially  different  in  many  important  demographic  and  economic 
characteristics from the rest of the population. 
To summarize, we observe that, while participation rates in mutual funds and retirement 
accounts differ, the vast majority of fund holders and account owners include stocks in them. 
As our econometric results will show, however, this similarity in observed patterns conceals 
important differences across mutual funds and retirement accounts. Participation in mutual 
funds  paves  the  way  for  inclusion  of  stocks  in  them  almost  regardless  of  household 
characteristics,  while  such  characteristics  are  important  for  determining  which  subset  of 
retirement account owners includes stocks in them. As for asset location, our finding that 
roughly  9  out  of  10  stockholders  do  not  use  all  three  stockholding  modes  points  to  the 
importance of understanding what lies behind asset location choices among stockholders. 
 
3.  The Model 
3.1.  Description 
We  build  a  model  of  household  stock  investment  that  features  the  decision  process 
shown in Fig. 1. Households face three (not mutually exclusive) investment choices: direct 
stockholding and investment in mutual funds and retirement accounts. If any of the latter two 
saving vehicles is chosen, then the household has to further decide whether to invest in stocks 
through them. This decision tree reflects observed participation patterns in the SCF, where   8 
holders of stock mutual funds are a subset of mutual fund owners, and the same is true for 
retirement accounts. 
As pointed out, for instance, by Greene (1998), it is important for estimation to take into 
account the censoring in the data created by the fact that we do not observe stock investment 
in mutual funds (retirement accounts) for those households that do not own any mutual funds 
(retirement  accounts).
7  This  goes  beyond  the  logical  necessity  of  having  the  broader 
instrument (e.g., mutual funds) in order to have the narrower instrument (e.g. stock mutual 
funds).  Even  in  the  absence  of  such  logical  necessity,  a  randomly  drawn  holder  of,  say, 
mutual funds would be more likely to own stock mutual funds than a household with similar 
characteristics chosen randomly from the whole population (comprising mutual fund owners 
and  non-owners).  This  difference  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  for  any  given  configuration  of 
observable characteristics, mutual fund owners have not only shown themselves to be willing 
to hold mutual funds in general, but they may have also acquired in the process specific 
information that facilitates ownership of stock mutual funds. As a result, a model that ignores 
the censoring issue and estimates the equation for stock investment in mutual funds on the 
whole sample can produce downward biased estimates of the probability to invest in stock 
mutual  funds  conditional  on  mutual  fund  ownership.  To  put  it  another way,  ignoring  the 
censoring problem is akin to estimating a wage equation on the whole population, which 
includes not only those employed but also the unemployed and those out of the labor force. 
A  key  aspect  of  our  model  is  that  it  allows  for  separate  hurdles  to  be  cleared  for 
participating in each stockholding mode, and for potentially different contributions of each 
household  characteristic  or  attitude  to  overcoming  such  hurdles.  We  further  allow  for  all 
possible pair-wise correlations among the unobservables of each investment decision. Such 
correlations among investment decisions can arise because of factors common to all of them, 
such as an understanding of stockholding risks, common monitoring costs, and appreciation 
of the benefits of diversification (see Alessie, Hochguertel and van Soest, 2004).   9 
Our model could in principle be extended to include other household asset choices, e.g. 
housing, that might have unobservables correlated with those of stocks. Although this could 
be a worthwhile extension for future research, we chose not to go beyond the already involved 
task of integrating the three issues in this paper. First, adding a sixth or more equations makes 
our model even harder to estimate. Second, the considerable additional computational burden 
would not affect consistency of our estimates, but only potentially increase their efficiency, if 
unobservables are indeed correlated. As in a standard multivariate probit model, an added 
equation does not affect consistency but only efficiency.  
Participation in mutual funds and retirement accounts is of interest in itself, but also as a 
first stage to the associated stockholding modes. The second stage decision may or may not be 
challenging, after the asset corresponding to the first stage has been chosen. For example, 
once somebody finds out about the nature, purpose, and rules of retirement accounts, the role 
and usefulness of stocks in these accounts may be quite clear. We would not, then, expect 
characteristics that show financial sophistication or willingness to assume higher risks to have 
significant further roles in determining inclusion of stocks, conditional on having opened the 
retirement account. 
Our multivariate probit model with selection integrates participation analysis with asset 
location. The latter refers to the choice of a given mode conditional on the household holding 
stocks in any form, while allowing for all possible correlations across different choices. We 
discuss results on location in Section 5. The issue of participation spillovers from retirement 
account ownership to other stockholding modes is discussed in Section 6. 
 
3.2. Econometric Specification 
This Section outlines econometric issues arising in the estimation of our model. A fuller 
treatment of these issues appears in Technical Appendix RA.I, available from the authors on 
request. The household decision process discussed above implies an empirical model that   10 
consists of a tri-variate probit with two further probit equations estimated on the censored 
samples of mutual fund and retirement account owners. The use of probit models adjusted for 
selectivity was pioneered by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). Another recent example of 
such models, in a different context from ours, is provided by Jenkins, Capellari, Lynn, Jäckel 
and Sala (2006), who use a bivariate probit specification with selection to study consent to 
give information during a survey interview.
8  
In  Table  5,  the  three  first-stage  equations  (1),  (2),  and  (4)  model,  respectively,  the 
decisions to hold stocks directly, to hold any kind of mutual funds, and to have a retirement 
account. The two probit selection equations, (3) and (5), model the decisions to hold stock 
mutual funds given ownership of any mutual fund and to have a stock retirement account 
given ownership of a retirement account. We allow for unrestricted correlations between error 
terms of the five underlying latent indices.
9  
Table 4 shows summary statistics of our conditioning variables that have been found in 
the literature to be good predictors of stockholding (for examples that use the SCF see Bertaut 
and Starr-McCluer, 2001; Shum and Faig, 2006; Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos, 2010).
10 
A full set of variable definitions is included in the Technical Appendix RA.II. An important 
addition is the usually omitted federal marginal tax rate. We construct our sample by pooling 
the  data  from  the  1995,  1998,  2001  and  2004  SCF  waves  (17,565  households).
11  In  our 
specification, we follow the common practice in the participation literature of assuming zero 
cohort effects and including time dummies.
12  
 Regression coefficients may give a misleading picture of the effect of a regressor in a 
non-linear multi-equation model with correlated disturbances. This result can obtain because 
coefficients do not reflect the regressor’s influence that is due to its presence in the equations 
for the other choices and that could be transmitted to the equation of interest through the 
cross-correlated disturbances.
13 Therefore, we focus instead on the marginal effects of the 
regressors, defined as the change in the probabilities of interest when there are appropriately   11 
defined
14 changes in the value of the regressors (coefficient estimates can be found in  Table 
RA.1  in  the  Technical  Appendix).  We  estimate    probabilities,  marginal  effects  and  their 
standard  errors  via  Monte  Carlo  simulation  (Appendix  A).  Given  that  correlations  of 
disturbances can have substantial effects on calculation of probabilities, we check their joint 
statistical significance (Appendix B).  
 
3.3. Model Performance 
An attractive feature of the model is that it allows the computation of a wide range of 
probabilities  pertaining  to  participation,  location,  and  spillovers.  In  Table  6,  we  display 
predicted  participation  rates,  both  conditional  and  unconditional,  generated  by  estimated 
probabilities. Our estimates match closely the corresponding participation rates observed in 
the data, although the model was not calibrated with this objective in mind. This suggests that 
our model has considerable predictive power for population stockholding choices. 
Our model makes it possible to estimate also marginal effects regarding ownership of 
any type of stocks,
15 i.e. the question that existing participation literature normally addresses 
without  differentiating  across  paths  to  stockholding.  We  thus  compare  marginal  effects 
derived from our disaggregated model to the corresponding ones from a ‘typical’ participation 
regression that combines all stockholding modes together.  
It is reassuring, both for the existing literature on stockholding participation and for our 
model, that estimated marginal effects for overall stockholding obtained from both models are 
very similar in sign, size, and patterns of significance (for brevity, these effects are reported in 
Table RA.2, cols. 1-4, in the Technical Appendix). This similarity suggests that the standard 
practice  of  merging  three  different  stockholding  modes  is  not  misleading  when  overall 
stockholding  participation  is  of  interest.  Our  model,  however,  allows  a  novel  anatomical 
probe into influences of observables on the different paths to stockholding, the correlations 
between unobservable influences, the hitherto unexplored link between asset participation and   12 
asset location, and the issue of participation spillovers across assets, in the context of a single 
estimation  model  consistent  both  with  the  data  and  with  existing  findings  on  overall 
participation.  
 
3.4. Correlations between Unobserved Factors 
As already discussed, our econometric model not only distinguishes between different 
stockholding modes but also allows choices of different saving instruments and stockholding 
vehicles to be correlated through the influence of unobserved factors. When we test for the 
joint significance of all cross-equation correlations, we indeed find that we can decisively 
reject the null of no significance (details can be found in Appendix B). When we test for 
statistical significance of each possible correlation individually, we find several (albeit not all) 
estimates of such correlations to be individually statistically significant.
16  
 
4.  The Different Paths to Stockholding 
Although direct stockholding, stock mutual funds, and stock retirement accounts all 
expose households to stockholding risk, they vary in their diversification properties, liquidity, 
and informational requirements on the part of investors. Given these differences, it is quite 
plausible  that  specific  household  characteristics  will  have  differential  contributions  to 
participation across stockholding modes. Knowing the characteristics that make households 
more  likely  to  choose  particular  stockholding  modes  constitutes  important  economic 
information, both for policy makers interested  in distributional consequences of measures 
affecting asset returns and for practitioners seeking to gain insight on the portfolio choices of 
their potential clienteles. 
In this Section, we employ our model to estimate contributions of various household 
characteristics to the use of each possible stockholding mode, controlling for other observed 
factors and allowing for correlations across model nodes induced by unobserved factors. For   13 
stockholding through mutual funds and retirement accounts, this consists of two steps: the 
marginal  contribution  to  opening  the  account,  and  that  to  including  stocks  in  it  given 
ownership of the account. Results are presented in Table 7. 
 
4.1.   Direct Stockholding 
In the first column of Table 7, we present marginal effects for direct stockownership. 
We typically think of direct stockholding as imposing heavy demands on the investor, by 
requiring  considerable  financial  sophistication  and  ability  to  process  complex  new 
information  quickly.  Our  findings  underscore  the  importance  of  such  considerations.  The 
single  most  important  contribution  to  direct  stockholding  comes  from  having  a  college 
degree, which raises participation probability by more than 15 pp over that of a high school 
dropout.
17 This result is likely linked to the superior knowledge and information processing 
ability provided by college education. Participation in direct stockholding is further increased 
by about 4 pp if a household member works in the financial sector. This finding likely arises 
partly from financial knowledge and information that this member brings home and partly 
from bonuses and payments in stocks. 
Although knowledge and information could also be imparted through informal social 
interactions, we do not find that asking friends or relatives for investment advice affects the 
probability of direct stockholding. At first glance this result seems to contradict the findings 
of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) on social interactions. However, it is consistent with their 
conjecture that social interactions may not foster or may even reduce participation in assets 
not widely held, as is the case with directly held stocks: a random prospective investor would 
have about one chance in five to find direct stockholders in her social circle.
18  
Is direct stockholding a more common investment choice among the risk-taking rich? 
Our findings support the view that household (taxable) resources play an important role: the 
semi-elasticity of real wealth is 2 pp while that of net financial wealth (directly held stocks   14 
excluded)
19 is .4 pp. Willingness to undertake substantial financial risk also makes a sizeable 
contribution (almost 9 pp). For given level of resources and willingness to take portfolio risk, 
background income risk associated with working in a high-risk sector lowers the chances of 
direct stockholding. 
The estimated effect of the federal marginal tax rate is positive.
20 Given that we are 
controlling for resources, a higher marginal tax rate means that the household is able to take 
fewer income tax deductions, but this does not discourage it from taxable direct stockholding. 
The more favorable tax treatment of dividends, the fact that capital gains are taxed only at 
realization,  and  the  possibility  of  foregoing  capital  gains  tax  if  stocks  are  passed  on  to 
descendants (‘step up of basis’) apparently combine to encourage direct stockholding among 
households  facing  higher  marginal  tax  rates.  The  importance  of  such  considerations  is 
corroborated  by  estimated  marginal  effects  of  variables  more  directly  linked  to  bequest 
motives: having received inheritance and planning to leave a bequest contribute about 5 and 6 
pp respectively. 
Finally, controlling for current financial resources, poor health has a sizeable negative 
contribution to direct stockholding of roughly 5 pp, which is consistent with existing findings 
(Rosen  and  Wu,  2004)  and  with  the  view  that  direct  stockholding  imposes  considerable 
demands on investing households. 
 
4.2. Stockholding through Mutual Funds 
Unlike direct stockholding, mutual funds are typically managed by professionals and 
are  well-diversified.  These  features  often  lead  to  the  presumption  that  mutual  funds 
investments are open to all households because they do not require considerable financial 
sophistication and information gathering. Our findings are not consistent with this view, as 
can be seen in column 3 of Table 7. Educational attainment makes a considerable contribution 
to participation in mutual funds, with estimated marginal effects of a college degree at least as   15 
large as those for direct stockholding. The same is true for being in a managerial position. 
Having worked in the financial sector continues to play an important role, albeit somewhat 
smaller than for direct stockholding.  
A  possible  source  of  these  findings  is  that  the  proliferation  of  mutual  funds  has 
reintroduced informational requirements from the back door: households now face a need to 
collect information on how to choose among the huge variety of mutual funds and on how to 
monitor those who run them.
21 Furthermore, a higher level of educational attainment makes it 
more likely to understand and appreciate the advantages of mutual fund investment, such as 
risk  diversification.
22  On  the  other  hand,  social  interactions  do  not  appear  to  reduce  the 
relevance of financial knowledge. This result is consistent with the fact that mutual funds are 
not widely held; therefore, individuals that invest in them are not very likely to find in their 
social circle other mutual fund owners. 
Column 5 in Table 7 reports marginal effects for the choice to hold stock mutual funds, 
given that the household owns any mutual funds at all. We find that opening a mutual fund 
account represents the major participation threshold. Once households take this first step, their 
further investment in stock mutual funds is not influenced in a statistically significant way by 
education,  financial  sophistication,  resources,  race,  or  financial  attitudes  (except  for  the 
willingness to assume financial risk). This finding suggests that the willingness to take risk is 
the key factor that influences the choice of mutual fund owners regarding whether to invest in 
stocks through these saving vehicles or not. More generally, it appears that, in the process of 
learning  about  mutual  funds  in  general,  investors  acquire  the  relevant  information  about 
including stocks in their mutual fund holdings. As a result, such investment follows naturally, 
provided the investor is sufficiently willing to undertake financial risk. This is a new result 
that is due to the design of our model, and that, as discussed below, differentiates mutual 
funds  from  retirement  accounts.  Importantly,  this  differentiation  would  be  impossible  to 
uncover by just looking at descriptive statistics.
23   16 
4.3 Stockholding in Retirement Accounts 
The use of retirement accounts as supplements to public pensions appears to be a policy 
priority because of the aging of the population and the associated increased ratio of retirees to 
working contributors to the public pension system. While descriptive statistics suggest that 
only  about  one  in  two  US  households  own  retirement  accounts,  we  further  show  in  this 
Section that such ownership is much more limited among households with low education or 
resources.  
Marginal effects for ownership of retirement accounts are shown in column 7 of Table 
7. It is striking that education has a sizeable role to play in retirement account ownership, 
even after controlling for other household characteristics and attitudes. The estimated size of 
the marginal effect of a college degree is  21 pp compared to a household where the financial 
decision maker is a high-school dropout, but even that of a high-school certificate is about 14 
pp. It is also notable that being white increases the probability of participation in retirement 
accounts by 9 pp and that declaring poor health reduces it by 12 pp.  
Richer households and those in a higher federal marginal tax bracket are substantially 
more likely to participate in retirement accounts. The latter result can be partly attributed to 
gains such households could reap from tax deferrals. Further, households with a managerial or 
professional occupation are by 6 pp more likely to own retirement accounts, partly because 
such plans are sometimes offered to these occupational groups as a part of their compensation 
package.  Being  credit  constrained  reduces  significantly  the  probability  of  investing  in  a 
retirement account. Given that we control for economic resources, this result is not simply due 
to being ‘poorer’. Perceived inability to borrow probably discourages participation in plans 
that imply payment commitments over a prolonged period of time, for fear of being unable to 
meet them every period.  
These  findings  suggest  that  there  are  significant  obstacles  to  opening  retirement 
accounts, even though ailing social insurance systems affect the population very broadly. The   17 
financial  industry  itself  could  help  people  overcome  such  obstacles,  e.g.  through  more 
informative and targeted advertising. In addition, governments could design more effective 
informational campaigns and promote specially  designed ‘default options’ in occupational 
retirement plans.  
Our findings suggest some factors that are likely to facilitate or impede the process of 
spreading  retirement  account  ownership.  Based  on  our  findings,  the  public  perception 
regarding  retirement  accounts  is  still  that  of  a  quite  risky  financial  instrument.  Declared 
willingness  to  undertake  significant  risks  for  substantial  returns  contributes  8  pp  to  the 
probability of participation, an estimate greater than that for mutual funds and comparable to 
the risky option of direct stockholding. On the other hand, social interactions are found to 
have a positive and significant effect on retirement account ownership (albeit at the 10% 
level), consistent with the fact that they are held by a sizeable fraction of the population.  
Interestingly, once households decide to participate in a retirement account, the choice 
to include stocks in such an account is sensitive to household characteristics that are similar to 
those  contributing  to  direct  stockholding  (Table  7,  col.  9).  Our  estimates  suggest  that 
willingness to bear the risk associated with stocks in retirement accounts is quite crucial when 
the objective is to provide for old age and the instrument is quite illiquid, as in the case of 
these accounts. Furthermore, stockholding through retirement accounts is fostered by being in 
a couple, having higher education, being white, having a long investment horizon, being a 
manager, a larger net real wealth, and an intention to leave a bequest. It is also encouraged by 
social interactions, thus strengthening their role found in the participation equation. 
The contrast with mutual funds, where investment in stock mutual funds depends only 
on the willingness to take risk once mutual fund participation is decided, is quite striking. The 
fact that several factors contribute to the inclusion of stocks in retirement accounts helps us 
understand why not all retirement account owners make that choice, even if the majority do. 
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5.  Asset Location: What Influences where Stockholders Keep their Stocks? 
People who decide to hold stocks face choices regarding the particular saving vehicles 
they use for stockholding: direct, in mutual funds, in retirement accounts. They differ in both 
risk and liquidity characteristics, as well as in tax treatment. The first two vehicles are taxable, 
whereas investments in the third one are most often tax deferred, i.e. investors pay taxes on 
them  only  when  they  collect  their  retirement  income.  The  choices  investors  make  have 
implications for practitioners dealing with these financial products, but importantly also for 
governments concerned about retirement preparedness and about the timing of tax revenues.  
In terms of descriptive statistics, Table 3 shows the fractions of stockholders choosing 
each possible combination of stockholding modes, and allows us to see the most popular 
placement options. By adding the relevant percentages in the last column, it can be seen that 
almost  three  quarters  of  stockholders  hold  combinations  that  include  stocks  in  retirement 
accounts, about 40% hold combinations that entail direct stockholding, while about 30% place 
stocks in mutual funds. This leads to the question of which characteristics favor each of the 
three not mutually exclusive choices, conditional on the household holding any stocks (i.e. 
conditional on being in at least one of the three nodes involving stocks).
24  
Table 8 reports a number of estimated conditional marginal effects. Single males tend to 
locate  their  investments  in  stocks  held  directly,  while  their  female  counterparts  in  stock 
mutual funds. Overconfidence of males found in other contexts such as stock trading (Barber 
and Odean, 2001), could be relevant for this observed pattern. Race continues to matter even 
among stockholders: minority households exhibit on average lower probabilities of holding 
stocks directly or through mutual funds (by about 6 pp), and by about half of this for putting 
stocks in retirement accounts.  
The pattern of marginal effects for direct stockholding is quite similar whether they 
refer to participation or to asset location (as shown in Table 7, column 1 and Table 8, column 
1), with the exception of being in poor health. This implies that whether we draw from the   19 
general population or we condition on the household being a stockholder does not make a 
significant difference with respect to the hurdle the household needs to pass in order to hold 
stocks directly. Intuitively, given that most stockholders own stocks in retirement accounts, 
conditioning on stock ownership essentially picks out stock retirement account owners. Our 
results, therefore, suggest that participation in stock retirement accounts does not particularly 
simplify the task of holding stocks directly. 
As already discussed, passing the threshold for mutual fund ownership essentially paves 
the  way  to  participation  in  stock  mutual  funds:  household  characteristics  make  a  limited 
contribution  to  owning  stock  mutual  funds,  when  the  conditioning  event  is  ownership  of 
mutual funds. By contrast, the strong marginal effects for stock mutual fund ownership shown 
in col. 3 of Table 8 are due to the much weaker conditioning event of owning stocks in any 
form.  Only  about  36%  of  stockholders  in  our  sample  have  also  passed  the  participation 
threshold  for  mutual  funds,  leaving  considerable  room  for  characteristics  to  induce  stock 
mutual fund ownership.  
Moreover, it is striking that we find a number of significant marginal effects for placing 
stocks in retirement accounts when conditioning on any stockholding, even though 80% of 
stockholders own stock retirement accounts. As a result, these effects regard the remaining 
20%, who consider extending stockholding from taxable liquid instruments to the tax-deferred 
and less liquid retirement accounts. We find that such an extension is significantly encouraged 
by characteristics like working in a low-risk industry sector and being a manager, investment 
attitudes  (expressing  willingness  to  take  above  average  financial  risk,  having  a  long 
investment horizon), race, and being subject to a higher marginal tax rate.  
An  alternative  approach  to  modeling  the  location  decision  is  to  assume  that  the 
household first decides to hold stocks in any form, and then, conditional on deciding to own 
stocks, chooses one or more of the three possible modes in which to hold them (i.e., directly, 
in mutual funds, and in retirement accounts). Although this decision process seems harder to   20 
justify in view of trends observed in the data,
25 estimating this alternative model can provide a 
useful test of robustness of our findings on stock location. 
This alternative model (described in more detail in Technical Appendix RA.II), can be 
used  to  estimate  four  probabilities  that  are  comparable  to  our  baseline  model:  the 
unconditional probability to own stocks in any form, and the three conditional probabilities of 
holding stocks in a specific investment vehicle, conditional on owning stocks in any form. 
Reassuringly, the results for the first probability (shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table RA.2 in 
the Technical Appendix) are very close to the ones we obtain from our multivariate model as 
well as those of the simple probit. The similarity of the results largely extends to marginal 
effects of the three conditional location probabilities that are shown in Table 9. Only in the 
case of stocks in retirement accounts do we note a few differences: in the alternative model, 
being white, in poor health, and talking to friends/relatives/work contacts about investments 
play no role, while using the Internet to obtain financial information does. 
 
6.  Asset Participation Spillovers 
The high rate of ownership of retirement accounts is associated with rates of overall 
stock market participation of US households that hover around 50%. Has the recent spread of 
retirement accounts encouraged stockholding in forms other than stock retirement accounts, 
leading  to  increased  exposure  to  stockholding  risk  in  taxable,  liquid  instruments  such  as 
mutual funds or directly held stocks? In this Section, we explore the implications of having 
passed the ownership threshold of retirement accounts for each stockholding mode: direct, 
through mutual funds, and through retirement accounts.  
Table  6  reports  observed  participation  rates  and  corresponding  predictions  of  our 
model. Proportions of stockholders in any form are higher among retirement account owners 
than  in  the  general  population.  Among  such  owners,  75%  own  stocks  in  their  retirement 
accounts, 30% own stocks directly, and 23% own stocks in mutual funds. The corresponding   21 
proportions in the general population are much lower: 38%, 19%, and 14%. As discussed 
above,  our  model  matches  quite  well  all  conditional  and  unconditional  participation  rates 
observed in the data. 
Based on these numbers, owning a retirement account implies higher probabilities of 
owning  stocks  in  any  form.  Is  this  because  the  process  of  opening  and  maintaining  a 
retirement account facilitates stock ownership, e.g. by familiarizing households with asset 
holding, investment opportunities, managed funds, etc? Or is it because households who have 
retirement  accounts  have  characteristics  and  attitudes  more  conducive  to  stockholding 
anyway?  
Table 4, which describes the various samples, shows that owners of retirement accounts 
are more likely to possess characteristics that facilitate stockholding. Relative to the general 
population, owners of retirement accounts are more likely to have a college degree, to be 
willing to assume above average financial risk, to have received inheritance and consider 
leaving a bequest, to have an investment horizon longer than 10 years, to be richer in income 
and wealth; and less likely to be liquidity constrained. Is there anything beyond this?   
In exploring this issue, one needs to recognize that ownership of retirement accounts is 
not  the  result  of  a  random  assignment  but  of  a  choice  that  depends  on  household 
characteristics and attitudes explicitly modeled in our setup. If the process of acquiring and 
owning  a  retirement  account  itself  significantly  facilitates  stockholding  either  directly  or 
through stock mutual funds, we would expect household characteristics and attitudes to make 
less  of  a  difference  to  stockholding  through  these  modes  once  we  condition  on  having 
retirement accounts.
26 For example, having a college degree should make less of a difference 
to  whether  retirement  account  owners  (rather  than  the  general  population)  participate  in 
directly held stocks or stock mutual funds. Technically, marginal effects on participation in 
these other forms of stockholding, conditional on retirement account ownership, should be   22 
insignificant or much smaller than the unconditional ones which refer to an investor picked 
randomly from the whole population.  
Marginal effects conditional on ownership of retirement accounts are presented in Table 
10 (col. 1 for directly held stocks; col. 3 for stock mutual funds). For comparison, column 1 in 
Table 7, and column 5 in Table 10 report the corresponding unconditional marginal effects. 
We observe that conditioning on participation in retirement accounts does not change the sign 
or  significance  of  contributions  of  household  characteristics,  investment  attitudes,  and 
practices to participation in direct stockholding and in stock mutual funds; and, if anything, it 
increases  the  estimated  size  of  such  contributions,  including  those  linked  to  financial 
awareness and sophistication. Having a college degree or more and working or having worked 
in the financial sector are estimated to contribute more to participation in directly held stocks 
or  in  stock  mutual  funds  when  conditioning  on  participation  in  retirement  accounts.  The 
above findings challenge the hypothesis that the participation process for retirement accounts 
provides sufficient information and awareness to facilitate other forms of stockholding. 
All in all, our findings imply that retirement account owners represent a pool more likely to 
invest in other forms of stockholding than the general population, but this is mainly because 
of characteristics that led them to buy retirement accounts in the first place rather than of any 
informational advantages gained through retirement account ownership itself.  
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
We have estimated an econometric model flexible enough to address in an integrated 
framework  the  interrelated  issues  of  stock  market  participation,  stock  location,  and 
participation spillovers. The model distinguishes between stockholding modes with different 
degrees  of  liquidity,  riskiness,  diversification,  as  well  as  differences  in  management 
requirements and transactions costs. Making such a distinction and allowing for correlated 
choices are supported by our econometric findings; predicted participation rates closely match   23 
the  observed  ones  and  correlations  among  unobservables  are  typically  economically  and 
statistically significant.  
Our  findings  stress  the  importance  of  educational  attainment  and  financial 
sophistication, even for ownership of assets held in managed accounts. Still, we find a striking 
difference between stock mutual funds and stocks in retirement accounts. The probability that 
any  mutual  fund  owner  holds  stock  mutual  funds  is  basically  the  same  regardless  of 
characteristics. In contrast, stock retirement accounts tend to be chosen by retirement account 
owners  with  characteristics  similar  to  those  favoring  direct  stockholding  in  the  general 
population. This is surprising, given the typically much greater degree of diversification in 
stock retirement accounts compared to individual stocks. The finding is consistent with a 
more  limited  willingness  of  households  to  take  risks  with  retirement  wealth  than  with 
investments in mutual funds.  
Our  findings  on  asset  location  and  on  participation  spillovers  suggest  that  even  the 
choice to include stocks in one’s retirement accounts per se does not imply that this household 
is more likely to branch out to direct stockholding or to holding stocks through mutual funds.  
At first reading, there is an apparent contradiction between some of our results in these 
two Sections. In our analysis of asset location, we find that the contribution of characteristics 
like education and willingness to assume higher risks to owning stocks directly or through 
mutual funds remains essentially the same, whether this choice is made by a stockholder or by 
a randomly picked person in the general population. Given that 80% of stockholders own 
stock retirement accounts, this finding raises doubts as to whether even those who choose to 
include  stocks  in  their  retirement  accounts  will  generally  branch  out  to  other  forms  of 
stockholding.  
On  the  other  hand,  our  Section  on  spillovers  shows  that  retirement  account  owners 
represent  a  pool  more  likely  to  invest  in  other  forms  of  stockholding  than  the  general 
population.  Although  this  may  appear  contradictory  at  first,  our  analysis  of  participation   24 
spillovers shows that this greater propensity of retirement account owners to invest in the 
other two stock vehicles is mainly due to the characteristics that led them to own retirement 
accounts in the first place rather than to any informational or other advantages gained through 
such ownership per se.  
Our  results  have  implications  both  for  policy  and  for  financial  practice.  First,  they 
contribute to the discussion on financial literacy programs (see, e.g., Lusardi, forthcoming) by 
providing  evidence that education  and financial sophistication play  a significant role in  a 
much wider range of stock-related decisions than previously thought. These factors are linked 
not only to overall stockholding but also to investment in each of the three stockholding 
modes.
27 They are also significant for stock location decisions; and for participation spillovers 
from retirement accounts to direct stockholding and to ownership of stock mutual funds.  
Second, while owning retirement accounts makes stock ownership in all three modes 
more  likely,  the  spread  of  retirement  accounts  does  not  promote  investment  in  stocks 
uniformly across households, either within retirement accounts or outside them. For example, 
the less educated, less wealthy, more risk averse and those with shorter planning horizons are 
less likely to overcome the additional hurdle for stock ownership in any of the three modes, 
even  if  they  own  a  retirement  account.  Therefore,  appropriate  use  of  default  options  in 
occupational retirement plans may well be needed to steer households towards or away from 
stockholding, depending on policy objectives.  
Last but not least, our findings on the relevance of household characteristics could be of 
use to financial practitioners interested in targeting customers to market a broad range of 
financial  products.  Specifically,  they  could  be  used  to  pinpoint  characteristics  that  make 
people  more  likely  to  invest  in  a  particular  financial  product,  such  as  mutual  funds  or 
retirement accounts, and in a particular stock vehicle; and to exploit the interdependencies and 
spillovers of household choices across a range of financial products on offer.    25 
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Appendix A: Estimates and Standard Errors of Probabilities and Marginal Effects 
Given that probabilities and marginal effects are non-linear functions of the estimated 
coefficients, we calculate them by simulation. We proceed as follows: i) we draw from the 
distribution  of  the  maximum  likelihood  coefficients  assuming  that  they  are  distributed 
normally  with  means  and  variance-covariance  matrix  equal  to  the  maximum  likelihood 
estimates; ii) for a given parameter draw we compute the probabilities and marginal effects 
for  each  household  and  then  we  take  the  weighted  average  of  those  magnitudes  across 
households, i.e., we compute the average magnitude corresponding to that draw
28; iii) the final 
estimate of the magnitude of interest and its standard error are then computed as the mean and 
standard deviation respectively of the distribution of the average magnitudes in (ii) across all 
parameter draws. 
 
Appendix B: Tests of Correlations Across Disturbances  
We use the F-test suggested by Li, Raghunathan and Rubin (1991) to account for the 
uncertainty  induced  by  multiple  imputation.  We  first  perform  the  test  by  including  all 
correlation  coefficients  except  two,  namely  the  correlations  ρvn  and  ρεe  of  the  errors  that 
reflect selection within the two saving vehicles of mutual funds and retirement accounts. The 
value of the F-statistics is equal to 51.3 (p-value: 0), which strongly rejects the null hypothesis 
of zero correlation of the errors across the three saving vehicles (direct stocks, mutual funds 
and retirement accounts) and the two second stage equations. When we add the correlation of 
the errors within the two saving vehicles of mutual funds and retirement accounts the F-
statistic is equal to 42.5 (p-value: 0), again strongly rejecting the null. Thus, we cannot ignore 
the correlations of the unobserved factors across equations when computing the probabilities 
of asset choices of interest.  
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Table 1: Ownership Rates 
 


















1995  15.2  15.3  11.3 
[74.1]  46.5  30.3 
[65.2] 
1998  19.2  19.5  15.2 
[78.0]  50.8  39.2 
[77.0] 
2001  21.3  21.1  16.7 
[79.0]  54  43.4 
[80.5] 
2004  20.7  17.9  14.3 
[79.9]  52.1  39.6 
[76.0] 
           
 
Notes: Data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF. The reported statistics 
are weighted and corrected for multiple imputation.  
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Table 2: Stock Ownership Rates among 
Stocks Owners 
 








1995  37.7  28.0  75.0 
1998  39.3  31.1  80.1 
2001  41.0  32.1  83.6 
2004  42.5  29.4  81.5 
           
 
 
Notes: Data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the 
SCF.    The  reported  statistics  are  weighted  and  corrected  for 
multiple imputation.  
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Yes  No  No  10 
No  Yes  No  6.4 
No  No  Yes  43.3 
Yes  Yes  No  3.2 
No  Yes  Yes  9.9 
Yes  No  Yes  16.5 
Yes  Yes  Yes  10.7 
           
 
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  
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Has stocks in 
retirement 
accounts
Age (mean) 48.9 51.3 51.9 51.2 48.2 46.7
Couple 0.588 0.722 0.703 0.716 0.698 0.715
Single male 0.140 0.124 0.110 0.110 0.114 0.117
Has children 0.435 0.409 0.393 0.404 0.467 0.483
High school graduate 0.509 0.380 0.359 0.362 0.469 0.447
College degree or more 0.337 0.583 0.612 0.611 0.472 0.507
Self-employed 0.113 0.160 0.169 0.164 0.124 0.124
Retired 0.240 0.227 0.234 0.224 0.157 0.116
Unemployed/Inactive 0.051 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.018
White 0.762 0.897 0.910 0.908 0.841 0.851
Poor health 0.061 0.024 0.018 0.016 0.022 0.016
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk
0.205 0.365 0.359 0.375 0.288 0.334
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.143 0.214 0.245 0.252 0.196 0.217
Plans to leave a bequest 0.293 0.431 0.444 0.445 0.356 0.369
Has received inheritance 0.199 0.320 0.339 0.345 0.246 0.245
Credit constrained 0.224 0.124 0.085 0.089 0.167 0.166
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector 0.204 0.289 0.280 0.280 0.251 0.267
Has a managerial position 0.330 0.514 0.533 0.541 0.473 0.518
Federal marginal tax rate (mean) 0.173 0.232 0.230 0.232 0.220 0.229
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work 
contacts for financial information
0.360 0.366 0.346 0.350 0.374 0.391
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information
0.111 0.205 0.183 0.189 0.155 0.179
Works in high-risk industry sector 0.091 0.053 0.061 0.065 0.083 0.076
Non-investment income (median) 37,788 66,566 65,449 67,281 58,985 63,871
Net real wealth (median) 57,968 157,767 161,654 162,894 99,271 101,289
Net financial wealth (median) 9,943 146,726 168,318 176,365 61,123 68,988
 
 
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The reported statistics are weighted 
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                                         Table 5: Model Specification 
 
Eqn.  Outcome                         Latent propensities  Observed binary outcomes 
 
 
For each respondent i = 1, …, N:   
 
(1)  Owns stocks directly 
i i i u X DS + ¢ = q
*
  ) 0 (
* > = i i DS I DS  
       
(2)  Owns mutual funds 
i i i Z M n a + ¢ =
*
  ) 0 (
* > = i i M I M  
       
(3)  Holds stocks in mutual funds  i i i n W MS + ¢ = b
*  
     
, 1   if    ) 0 (
* = > = i i i M MS I MS
else unobserved 
       
(4)  Owns retirement accounts 
i i i G R e g + ¢ =
*
  ) 0 (
* > = i i R I R  
       
(5)  Holds stocks in retirement accounts 
i i i e Y RS + ¢ = d
*
  , 1   if   ) 0 (
* = > = i i i R RS I RS  
      else unobserved 
       
(6)  Error terms  ) , 0 ( ~ ) , , , , ( 5 W F i i i i i e n u e n , where   is a 
symmetric matrix with typical element ρhj= ρjh 
for h,j Î{u,v,n,ε,e} and j ¹ h,and ρjj=1 for all j. 
The errors in each equation are assumed to be 
orthogonal to the predictors. 
 
 
Notes: I(.) is an indicator function equal to one if its argument is true, and zero otherwise. 






   34  3




Owns stocks directly 0.19 0.21 0.004 ***
Owns mutual funds 0.18 0.20 0.004 ***
Owns retirement accounts 0.51 0.51 0.005 ***
Owns stocks in mutual funds 0.14 0.15 0.005 ***
Owns stocks in retirement accounts 0.38 0.39 0.006 ***
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns mutual funds 0.78 0.79 0.022 ***
Owns stocks in retirement accounts | owns retirement accounts 0.75 0.76 0.008 ***
Owns stocks directly | owns mutual funds 0.45 0.48 0.013 ***
Owns stocks directly | owns retirement accounts 0.30 0.33 0.008 ***
Owns stocks directly | owns stocks in mutual funds 0.46 0.50 0.013 ***
Owns stocks directly | owns stocks in retirement accounts 0.34 0.36 0.009 ***
Owns mutual funds | owns stocks directly 0.44 0.44 0.012 ***
Owns mutual funds | owns retirement accounts 0.29 0.31 0.007 ***
Owns retirement accounts | owns stocks directly 0.81 0.78 0.010 ***
Owns retirement accounts | owns mutual funds 0.81 0.80 0.010 ***
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns stocks directly 0.34 0.35 0.013 ***
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns retirement accounts 0.23 0.25 0.009 ***
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns stocks in retirement accounts 0.26 0.27 0.011 ***
Owns stocks in retirement accounts | owns stocks directly 0.68 0.65 0.012 ***
Owns stocks in retirement accounts | owns stocks in mutual funds 0.68 0.68 0.014 ***
Owns stocks in any form 0.48 0.50 0.005 ***
Owns stocks directly | owns stocks in any form 0.40 0.43 0.008 ***
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns stocks in any form 0.30 0.31 0.010 ***









Notes: All  unconditional probabilities  are  average  probabilities  calculated  over the full  sample.  All  conditional 
probabilities are average probabilities calculated over the sub-sample we condition on. SCF pooled data from 1995, 
1998, 2001, 2004 using survey weights and correcting for multiple imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively.    35  3
Table 7: Average Marginal Effects from Multivariate Probit Model with Selection 
(1) (3) (5) (7) (9)
M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff.
Couple 0.050 0.008 *** 0.014 0.008 * 0.042 0.023 * 0.072 0.009 *** 0.052 0.014 ***
Single male 0.028 0.010 *** -0.023 0.010 ** 0.024 0.028 -0.025 0.013 ** 0.024 0.020
High school graduate 0.078 0.009 *** 0.084 0.008 *** 0.018 0.044 0.139 0.013 *** 0.061 0.024 **
College degree or more 0.159 0.011 *** 0.182 0.010 *** -0.014 0.044 0.210 0.014 *** 0.092 0.026 ***
White 0.066 0.008 *** 0.068 0.008 *** 0.000 0.026 0.086 0.010 *** 0.072 0.017 ***
Poor health -0.050 0.015 *** -0.072 0.013 *** -0.048 0.051 -0.124 0.019 *** -0.065 0.037 *
Willingness to take above average financial risk 0.087 0.007 *** 0.062 0.007 *** 0.022 0.013 * 0.083 0.009 *** 0.089 0.011 ***
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.026 0.007 *** 0.044 0.007 *** 0.006 0.013 0.059 0.010 *** 0.036 0.012 ***
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work contacts for 
financial information
0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.007 * 0.023 0.011 **
Uses Internet to obtain financial information 0.067 0.009 *** 0.051 0.009 *** 0.009 0.017 0.064 0.012 *** 0.038 0.015 **
Non-investment income 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.002 *** 0.000 0.002
Net real wealth 0.020 0.002 *** 0.010 0.001 *** -0.003 0.003 0.014 0.001 *** 0.004 0.002 **
Net financial wealth 0.004 0.000 *** 0.004 0.000 *** -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000
Intention to leave a bequest 0.064 0.007 *** 0.054 0.006 *** -0.008 0.015 0.043 0.008 *** 0.029 0.010 ***
Has received inheritance 0.046 0.006 *** 0.044 0.006 *** 0.016 0.014 0.038 0.009 *** 0.013 0.010
Credit constrained -0.007 0.008 -0.060 0.009 *** -0.014 0.034 -0.048 0.009 *** -0.011 0.015
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector 0.040 0.007 *** 0.025 0.007 *** -0.020 0.014 0.015 0.008 * 0.007 0.011
Works in high-risk industry sector -0.045 0.009 *** -0.017 0.010 * 0.009 0.025 -0.037 0.012 *** -0.071 0.017 ***
Has a managerial position 0.024 0.007 *** 0.034 0.007 *** 0.012 0.016 0.058 0.009 *** 0.032 0.011 ***
Federal marginal tax rate 0.012 0.002 *** 0.011 0.002 *** 0.002 0.004 0.024 0.002 *** 0.010 0.003 ***
Correlation with Directly Held Stocks 0.232 0.015 *** 0.098 0.062 0.189 0.018 *** 0.188 0.030 ***
Correlation with Mutual Funds 0.119 0.387 0.218 0.017 *** 0.189 0.034 ***
Correlation with Mutual Funds in Stocks 0.074 0.064 0.075 0.056
Correlation with Retirement Accounts 0.490 0.329
Log likelihood
Number of observations 17,565
Stocks in Retirement 
Accounts   
(Conditional)
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Directly Held Stocks Mutual Funds 
Stocks in Mutual 









Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF. All estimates are corrected for multiple imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Additional regressors include a second degree polynomial in age, a dummy for having children, dummies for employment status, 
and dummies for years 1998, 2001, 2004. 
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Table 8: Average Marginal Effects on the Probability of Using a Stockholding Mode, Conditional 
on Stock Ownership 
 
(1) (3) (5)
M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff.
Couple 0.051 0.014 *** 0.001 0.014 0.037 0.010 ***
Single male 0.057 0.019 *** -0.032 0.017 * -0.015 0.015
High school graduate 0.072 0.019 *** 0.090 0.018 *** 0.016 0.016
College degree or more 0.159 0.021 *** 0.172 0.019 *** 0.011 0.016
White 0.062 0.015 *** 0.058 0.015 *** 0.027 0.012 **
Poor health -0.016 0.033 -0.078 0.026 *** -0.054 0.025 **
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk
0.084 0.010 *** 0.046 0.009 *** 0.039 0.007 ***
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.012 0.011 0.039 0.010 *** 0.028 0.008 ***
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work 
contacts for financial information
-0.006 0.010 -0.006 0.009 0.019 0.007 ***
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information
0.072 0.014 *** 0.042 0.013 *** 0.013 0.011
Non-investment income -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.006 0.002 ***
Net real wealth 0.027 0.003 *** 0.005 0.002 *** -0.001 0.001
Net financial wealth 0.004 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000
Intention to leave a bequest 0.078 0.011 *** 0.045 0.010 *** -0.005 0.007
Has received inheritance 0.053 0.010 *** 0.049 0.009 *** -0.006 0.008
Credit constrained 0.018 0.015 -0.082 0.017 *** -0.011 0.011
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector 0.056 0.011 *** 0.016 0.010 -0.013 0.008
Works in high-risk industry sector -0.052 0.017 *** 0.009 0.019 -0.030 0.013 **
Has a managerial position 0.010 0.011 0.030 0.011 *** 0.028 0.008 ***





on Having Stocks in 
any Form
Stocks in Mutual 
Funds, Conditional 
on Having Stocks in 
any Form
Stocks in Retirement 
Accounts, 
Conditional on 
Having Stocks in 
any Form
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
 
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The results for income, net real and non equity financial wealth 
represent  median semi-elasticities, while  for the remaining variables average  marginal  effects.  All estimates are  corrected for  multiple 
imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Additional regressors include a second degree polynomial in age, 
a dummy for having children, dummies for employment status, and dummies for years 1998, 2001, 2004.   37  3
Table 9: Average Marginal Effects on the Probability of Using a Stockholding Mode, 
Conditional on Stock Ownership, Alternative Model 
 
(1) (3) (5)
M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff.
Couple 0.048 0.015 *** 0.007 0.010 0.066 0.017 ***
Single male 0.064 0.020 *** -0.025 0.013 * -0.019 0.021
High school graduate 0.033 0.027 0.035 0.016 ** -0.004 0.030
College degree or more 0.113 0.027 *** 0.109 0.021 *** 0.009 0.030
White 0.058 0.015 *** 0.053 0.012 *** 0.026 0.019
Poor health 0.014 0.038 -0.041 0.021 ** -0.059 0.037
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk
0.083 0.012 *** 0.073 0.011 *** 0.088 0.015 ***
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.019 0.011 * 0.048 0.010 *** 0.067 0.014 ***
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work contacts 
for financial information
-0.013 0.010 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.012
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information
0.080 0.014 *** 0.051 0.012 *** 0.051 0.018 ***
Non-investment income -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.003 ***
Net real wealth 0.025 0.003 *** 0.005 0.002 *** -0.004 0.002
Net financial wealth 0.004 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000
Intention to leave a bequest 0.077 0.011 *** 0.047 0.009 *** 0.019 0.012
Has received inheritance 0.051 0.011 *** 0.047 0.010 *** 0.006 0.012
Credit constrained 0.000 0.016 -0.056 0.012 *** -0.028 0.018
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector 0.051 0.011 *** 0.020 0.008 *** -0.007 0.012
Works in high-risk industry sector -0.058 0.017 *** -0.010 0.012 -0.058 0.020 ***
Has a managerial position 0.018 0.012 0.036 0.009 *** 0.026 0.014 *





on Having Stocks in 
any Form
Stocks in Mutual 
Funds, Conditional 
on Having Stocks in 
any Form
Stocks in Retirement 
Accounts, 
Conditional on 
Having Stocks in 
any Form
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
  
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The results for income, net real and non equity financial wealth 
represent median semi-elasticities, while for the remaining variables average marginal effects. All estimates are corrected for multiple 
imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Additional regressors include a second degree polynomial in 
age, a dummy for having children, dummies for employment status, and dummies for years 1998, 2001, 2004.   38 3
Table 10: Average Marginal Effects on the Probability of Holding Stocks Directly or  
in Mutual Funds 
 
(1) (3) (5)
M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff.
Couple 0.063 0.011 *** 0.022 0.011 ** 0.019 0.007 ***
Single male 0.042 0.014 *** -0.017 0.012 -0.013 0.008
High school graduate 0.100 0.013 *** 0.093 0.012 *** 0.068 0.007 ***
College degree or more 0.199 0.015 *** 0.180 0.013 *** 0.139 0.009 ***
White 0.085 0.011 *** 0.071 0.011 *** 0.054 0.007 ***
Poor health -0.059 0.022 *** -0.084 0.018 *** -0.063 0.012 ***
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk
0.107 0.009 *** 0.067 0.008 *** 0.054 0.006 ***
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.030 0.009 *** 0.044 0.009 *** 0.036 0.006 ***
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work 
contacts for financial information
0.001 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information
0.083 0.012 *** 0.054 0.011 *** 0.043 0.008 ***
Non-investment income -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Net real wealth 0.028 0.003 *** 0.009 0.002 *** 0.007 0.001 ***
Net financial wealth 0.005 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 0.003 0.000 ***
Intention to leave a bequest 0.083 0.009 *** 0.053 0.007 *** 0.041 0.005 ***
Has received inheritance 0.059 0.008 *** 0.051 0.008 *** 0.038 0.005 ***
Credit constrained -0.005 0.012 -0.068 0.013 *** -0.050 0.009 ***
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector 0.052 0.009 *** 0.020 0.008 ** 0.016 0.006 ***
Works in high-risk industry sector -0.060 0.012 *** -0.014 0.014 -0.012 0.010
Has a managerial position 0.027 0.009 *** 0.036 0.009 *** 0.029 0.006 ***





on Holding any 
Retirement Accounts
Stocks in Mutual 
Funds, Conditional 
on Holding any 
Retirement Accounts
Stocks in Mutual 
Funds, 
Unconditional
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
 
 
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The results for income, net real and non equity financial 
wealth represent median semi-elasticities, while for the remaining variables average marginal effects. All estimates are corrected for 
multiple imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Additional regressors include a second degree 
polynomial in age, a dummy for having children, dummies for employment status, and dummies for years 1998, 2001, 2004.   39  3
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Interest in stocks as instruments for longer run investing was particularly stimulated by the high realized excess 
stock  returns,  especially  during  the  1990s.  The  idea  that  stock  return  risk  diminishes  with  the  length  of  the 
investment horizon, however, has been justifiably scrutinized in careful analyses (see Bodie, 1995).  
2 See Campbell  (2006), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Gollier (2001), Viceira (2001), 
Campbell and Viceira (2002), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), and Gomes 
and Michaelides (2005), the contributions in Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2001), Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli 
(2003), and Bogan (2008). 
3 The report states that “[t]he growth of equity ownership among America’s individual investors during the past 20 
years has been fueled largely by the expansion of defined contribution retirement plans, particularly 401(k) plans, 
which widely use stock mutual funds and other types of mutual funds as investment options. […] Between 1999 and 
2005, the number of households owning equities through employer-sponsored retirement plans grew by 5.2 million. 
Over the same period, the number of households owning equities outside these plans increased by 2.4 million. […] 
Defined contribution retirement plans also play an important role in introducing investors to equity investing and 
influence investors’ initial equity purchases. Today, nearly half of all equity owners began investing in equities by 
purchasing  stock  mutual  fund  shares  through  retirement  plans  at  work.  Among  younger  equity  investors,  the 
proportion is even greater.” (p. 2,3) 
4 Examining asset location would not be feasible with other US panel surveys (e.g. the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics or the Health and Retirement Study). This is the case because these panel surveys do not distinguish 
across the three stockholding modes (i.e. direct stocks and stock mutual funds are reported as one asset category); 
and secondly because every IRA holder is automatically classified as owning stocks through IRAs in view of the fact 
that the exact fraction invested in stocks is not directly reported (i.e. respondents are asked whether they have mostly 
invested in stocks/mostly in bonds or split between the two). 
5 For this reason we only report the proportions by pooling all four years together. 
6 Using findings in Carroll and Samwick (1997) we consider Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction 
as high income risk sectors. 
7 Greene uses a multivariate probit with censoring to study default in credit card loans. This model choice is dictated 
by the fact that defaults are observed only for the selected sample of credit card holders. 
8 We use those authors’ equation formulation and notation for our model setup. See also Christelis and Georgarakos 
(2008), who have used a multivariate probit with selection to study household investment in foreign assets. 
9 The likelihood function is described in further detail in the Technical Appendix. 
10 While our complex econometric model sheds light on various aspects of participation, location, and spillovers, it is 
not easily extended to analysis of amounts held in stocks. For analysis of the determinants of stockholding amounts, 
see Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2001) and Shum and Faig (2006).  
11 Information on some of the covariates we use in our estimation is available only since 1995 
12 Cohort effects cannot be separately estimated from age and time effects, given the linear relationship linking age, 
time, and cohort. The commonly used assumption of zero cohort effects has been found by Ameriks and Zeldes 
(2004)  to  be  compatible  with  most  of  the  observed  stockownership  patterns  in  the  data.  In  a  recent  paper, 
Malmendier and Nagel (forthcoming) adopt a more flexible specification that takes into account year and age effects 
as well as life experiences with stock returns that vary not only across but also within a given cohort. They show that 
those who have experienced low-stock market returns over their lives have a lower probability to invest in stocks. 
13 In addition, coefficients in multivariate probit models are only identified up to scale and show the influence of the 
regressors on latent variables with no obvious quantitative dimension. 
14 For dummy variables we consider a change from 0 to 1. For income- and wealth-related continuous variables we 
present median semi-elasticities (corresponding to a change of 5,000 dollars in 2004 prices). We choose the median 
since semi-elasticities involve multiplication by the amounts, which are very skewed. Hence the median is to be 
preferred to the mean in this case. The marginal effect of age is evaluated when age is incremented by one for all 
household heads, while the marginal effect of the federal marginal tax rate is evaluated when the rate is incremented 
by five percentage points for all households. 
15 This probability is equal to the sum of the probabilities of all asset combinations in which at least one stockholding 
mode is chosen. 
16 We find statistically significant positive correlations between unobserved factors influencing participation in direct 
stockholding and each one of mutual funds, retirement accounts, and stocks in retirement accounts. In addition, 
unobserved  factors  influencing  participation  in  stock  mutual  funds  are  correlated  with  those  influencing  
participation in retirement accounts. 
17 Even a high-school certificate makes substantial difference (just under 8 pp).   41 
                                                                                                                                                              
4
18 SCF asks explicitly whether a household asks friends or uses the Internet to obtain financial information, allowing 
for a direct assessment of their contribution on stockholding. 
19 Net financial wealth enters in each equation after deducting the amount of the asset in question in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems.   
20 We modify the federal marginal tax rate as in Alessie, Hochguertel and Van Soest (2004), in order to avoid 
endogeneity issues due to dividend income (see Appendix A). 
21 The finding is also consistent with results on the role of education in encouraging gains and avoiding losses in 
mutual funds in Bilias, Georgarakos, Haliassos (2008). 
22 Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2007) show that,  in data from the 2005 Household Survey of the Dutch Central 
Bank (DNB), only about half of the respondents knew that mutual funds are less risky than individual company 
stocks, and the proportion of incorrect answers was dramatically larger among  households of low education. 
23 Roughly 80% of mutual fund investors also hold stocks in those mutual funds. The figures are analogous for 
retirement account holders, 80% of whom hold stocks in them. Estimates for retirement accounts, however, indicate 
very significant effects of numerous variables in the second stage equation that models stock investment within the 
accounts (see below). 
24 For example, the relevant probability for stocks in mutual funds is shown in (14). 
25 For example, there is a striking correlation since the early 1990s between the massive spread of retirement account 
ownership,  fueled  by  government  campaigns  and  tax  incentives,  and  the  considerable  increase  in  overall  stock 
market participation, with little movement in the other two candidate modes for stockholding (direct stockholding or 
in mutual fund ownership). This seems harder to justify as a mere shift in location preferences, but perhaps lends 
itself  more  naturally  to  the  interpretation  of  a  policy-induced  choice  to  participate  in  retirement  accounts, 
accompanied by a decision to include stocks in those long-horizon accounts.  
26 As regards stockholding through retirement accounts we have already seen that there is a distinct second threshold 
that owners of retirement accounts have to clear. We cannot compare conditional and unconditional marginal effects 
for stocks in retirement accounts because, by definition, one cannot hold stocks in this form without owning a 
retirement account. 
27 Indirectly for stock mutual funds, by facilitating investment in mutual funds. 
28 We do not evaluate marginal effects at sample means since this practice can lead to severely misleading results 
(see Train, 2003, pp. 33-34).  
 
Discussion Paper Series 
 
Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging, Universität Mannheim 
 
To order copies, please direct your request to the author of the title in question. 
 
Nr.  Autoren  Titel  Jahr 
196-10  Alexander Ludwig, 
Thomas Schelkle, 
Edgar Vogel 
Demographic Change, Human Capital and 
Welfare 
10 
197-10  Axel Börsch-Supan, 
Martin Gasche 
Zur Sinnhaftigkeit der Riester-Rente 
 
10 
198-10  Martin Gasche, 
Michael Ziegelmeyer 
Verbreitung der Riester-Rente – Hat die 
Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise Spuren 
hinterlassen? 
10 




200-10  Daniel Kemptner, 
Hendrik Jürges, Steffen 
Reinhold 
Changes in Compulsory Schooling and the  
Causal Effect of Education on Health: 
Evidence from Germany 
 
10 
201-10  Axel Börsch-Supan, 
Martin Gasche 
Kann die Riester-Rente die Rentenlücke in 
der gesetzlichen Rente schließen? 
 
10 
202-10  Annelies G. Blom, 
Edith D. de Leeuw, 
Joop J. Hox 
 
Interviewer Effects on Nonresponse  
in the European Social Survey 
 
10 
203-10  Martin Gasche 
 
Rentner und Rentnerinnen im deutschen 
Sozialversicherungssystem: 
Beitragsleistungen und Leistungsbezug 
10 
204-10  Dimitris Christelis, 
Dimitris Georgarakos,  
Michael Haliassos 
 
Differences in Portfolios across Countries: 




205-10  Martin Gasche 
 
Zusatzbeitrag und sozialer Ausgleich in der 
Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung: 
Anreizeffekte und Projektion bis 2030 
 
10 
206-10  Michael Hurd, 
Maarten van Rooij, 
Joachim Winter 
 




207-10  Michela Coppola, 
Christina Benita Wilke 
 
How sensitive are subjective retirement 
expectations to increases in the statutory 
retirement age? The German case 
 
10 
208-10  Dimitris Christelis, 
Dimitris Georgarakos,  
Michael Haliassos 
Stockholding:  
Participation, Location, and Spillovers 
10 
 